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Media summary 
 
To keep climate change within safe limits we need to change rich country consumption 
patterns: to ‘recompose’ consumption so that necessities are provided for all citizens but 
luxuries are restricted to reduce emissions. To provide a guide through this contentious 
territory I justify a notion of universal human needs and set out a method to identify 
necessities in a particular time and place. The study shows how this procedure can identify 
new forms of sustainable consumption that are fair, effective and legitimate. It also suggests 
hybrid forms of eco-social policy that can assist in the just recomposition of consumption. 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper focuses on consumption in the affluent world and the resulting level, composition 
and distribution of consumption-based emissions. It argues that public policy should foster 
the recomposition of consumption, while not disadvantaging poorer groups in the 
population. To combine these two imperatives entails making a distinction between goods 
and services that are necessary for a basic level of wellbeing, and those that are surplus to 
this requirement. The argument proceeds in six stages. First, the paper outlines a theory of 
universal need, as an alternative conception of wellbeing to consumer preference 
satisfaction. Second, it proposes a dual strategy methodology for identifying need satisfiers 
or necessities in a given social context.  Third, it applies this methodology to identify a 
minimum bundle of necessary consumption items in the UK and speculates how it might be 
used to identify a maximum bundle for sustainable consumption. The fourth part corporate 
barriers and structural obstacles in the path of sustainable consumption. The fifth part 
reveals a further problem: mitigation policies can result in perverse distributional outcomes 
when operating in contexts of great inequality. The final section suggests four eco-social 
public policies that would simultaneously advance sustainable and equitable consumption in 
rich nations.  
 
Acknowledgements: I am grateful to three anonymous referees of this paper, and at an 
earlier stage to many colleagues who advised on the work in progress. The Grantham 
Research Institute on Climate Change at the LSE provided helpful research assistance for this 
paper.  
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 2
Introduction: the issues 
 
Climate change is recognised as an egregious threat to human habitats and welfare. It 
requires global responses, such as those recognised, though inadequately, at Paris. The rich 
world has a disproportionate responsibility and a duty to mitigate emissions very fast. This 
paper concentrates on consumption and consumption-based emissions for reasons explained 
below. It is concerned only with the developed economies of the OECD. 
 
Simplifying greatly, there are three basic strategies for eliminating net carbon emissions by 
the second half of this century, the goal of the 2015 Paris Agreement: 
 
C1. Ramping up the ‘eco-efficiency of production’, by reducing energy and emission 
intensities of production. This is the hegemonic strategy today. 
 
C2. ‘Recomposing’ consumption: reducing consumption emissions by switching from high- to 
low-carbon services and goods, without necessarily cutting overall consumption 
expenditure. 
 
C3. Post-growth: reducing then stabilising absolute levels of consumer demand; moving 
towards a steady-state economy.  
 
This paper considers only C2, though in my forthcoming book I also discuss C1 and C3 
(Gough 2017).  
 
The assumption is that C1 alone cannot be adequate, for two main reasons. First, the 
embodied emissions of consumers in the developed world greatly exceed their production-
based emissions, whereas the reverse is true of the developing world 
(https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/EmbodiedCO2_Flyer.pdf). For reasons of justice and equity it 
is the people and places benefitting from the goods and services emitting GHG gases that 
should count, not the people and places where these are produced. Consumption emissions 
are more closely related to wellbeing outcomes than production emissions (Steinberger et 
al., 2012).1 Throughout this paper the emissions referred to are consumption-based 
emissions, not production-based or territorial emissions. 
 
Second, it is extremely unlikely that improvements in overall ‘emissions efficiency’ across 
economies can reduce GHG emissions fast enough to ensure a safe climatic regime (Jackson 
(2009), cf Stern (2015); Allwood et al (2013). To illustrate this, consider the decomposition of 
future consumption-based emissions in Sweden – Figure 1 (Larsson 2014; cf Nässen 2014). 
Under business-as-usual they more than double by 2015. If the rate of improvement of eco-
efficiency matches that of the previous fifteen years (1.4%pa), Sweden’s emissions would 
almost level out - a considerable achievement given that the ‘low hanging fruit’ will already 
have been picked. But even a further doubling of this rate (shown by the blue line) would 
not be enough to achieve the necessary emissions target of 2 tonnes per head by 2050 to 
have a reasonable chance of keeping global temperature rise below 2°C.  
                                                         1 It is true that people and places where goods are produced benefit from employment, 
wage income and profit, but they also suffer pollution and health costs. The need approach 
that informs this paper defines wellbeing in terms of non-monetary outcomes. 
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Figure 1. Scenarios for greenhouse gas emission from private consumption in 
Sweden 2012-2050Source: Larsson (2014) p.3. 
  
Thus, Larsson contends, ‘postmaterial’ (C2) or ‘sufficiency’ (C3) policies will also be needed. 
The next stage, shown by the green line, models a variety of C2 policies targeting, for 
instance, beef consumption, frequent air travel and expensive second homes. But these 
would still not be enough. A sustainable level of emissions is finally achieved in his model by 
introducing a C3 policy - a reduction in total consumption expenditure achieved by reducing 
reduced average hours of work. A major goal of this paper is to show how recomposing 
consumption (C2) might be operationalised.  
 
However, another goal must have equal weight in this exercise: equity and the maintenance 
of some adequate level of wellbeing for all citizens. Recomposing consumption in an unfair 
way by hitting those with low incomes would be unethical, illegitimate and 
counterproductive. Unfortunately, as discussed later, the goals of sustainability and equity 
are not easily reconciled in unequal, highly-commodified societies like our own.  
 
Thus we need a conceptual framework that can embrace both wellbeing and sustainable 
emissions. I argue that a theory of universal human needs can provide this framework. Since 
human needs are universal over time and space, and since there are strong moral claims for 
meeting the needs of all people, they provide a way of understanding wellbeing in rich 
countries that does not trespass on the need-satisfactions of other peoples now or of future 
generations, as the Brundtland Report advocates.  
 
Need theory enables us to distinguish necessities from luxuries2. To recompose equitably 
entails making a distinction between goods and services that are necessary for a basic level                                                         
2 ‘Luxuries’ suggests mansions and private yachts, but I cannot think of a better term to refer to 
everything that is not a ‘necessity’.  
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of wellbeing, and those that are surplus to this requirement. By prioritising the former need 
theory provides a bridge to relate social, global and intergenerational justice (Gough 2015). 
In the language of Giulio and Fuchs (2014), it enables us to define a ‘consumption corridor’ 
between minimum standards, allowing every individual to live a good life, and maximum 
standards, ensuring a limit on every individual’s use of natural and social resources in order 
to guarantee a good life for others in the present and in the future.  
 
The argument proceeds in six stages. First, the paper outlines a theory of universal need, as 
an alternative conception of wellbeing to consumer preference satisfaction. Second, it 
proposes a dual strategy methodology for identifying need satisfiers or necessities in a given 
social context.  Third, it applies this methodology to identify a minimum bundle of necessary 
consumption items in the UK and speculates how it might be used to identify a maximum 
bundle for sustainable consumption. The fourth part corporate barriers and structural 
obstacles in the path of sustainable consumption. The fifth part reveals a further problem: 
mitigation policies can result in perverse distributional outcomes when operating in contexts 
of great inequality. The final section suggests four eco-social public policies that would 
simultaneously advance sustainable and equitable consumption in rich nations.  
 
Human need and sustainable wellbeing 
 
Need theory challenges the dominant conception of wellbeing within economics, preference 
satisfaction theory. This rests on two normative foundations: that individuals are the best 
judges of their own preferences or wants, and that what is consumed should be determined 
by the private consumption preferences of individuals. It thus precludes questioning 
consumer preferences, except within narrow limits. However, it has been subject to 
numerous challenges.3 An alternative is required.  
 
In A Theory of Human Need (1991) Len Doyal and I identify a conceptual space of universal 
human need, recognize cultural variety in meeting needs, but aim to avoid subordinating the 
identification of needs to such cultural contexts. Our essential premise is that all individuals, 
everywhere in the world, at all times present and future, have certain basic needs. These 
must be met in order for people to avoid harm, to participate in society and to reflect 
critically upon the conditions in which they find themselves. Only if we understand needs in 
this way - in universal terms, applied across time and place – can we plan for and measure 
progress towards our social and environmental goals, both globally and into the future.   
 
The universality of need rests upon the belief that if needs are not satisfied then serious 
harm of some objective kind will result. This is not the same as subjective feelings like 
anxiety or unhappiness. It refers to functions not feelings. This harm implies obstacles to 
successful social participation. All our private and public goals are achieved on the basis of 
successful social interaction with others. It follows that participation in some form of social 
life without serious systematic limitations is our most basic human interest.  
 
Basic needs are then the universal preconditions for effective participation in any form of 
social life. To do this a person must be able to formulate aims, understand how to achieve 
them, and act to strive to achieve them in practice. Whatever a person’s goals, whatever the                                                         
3 In brief, on the grounds of subjectivity, epistemic irrationality, endogenous and adaptive 
preferences, the limitlessness of wants, the absence of moral evaluation, and the non-specificity of 
future preferences (Gough 2015).  
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cultural practices and values within which she lives, she will require certain prerequisites or 
basic needs, in order to strive towards those goals. In this way we identify, alongside social 
participation, health and autonomy as the most basic human needs. Survival is the most 
basic need, but all people require a modicum of good physical and mental health for 
effective social participation. Basic autonomy can be defined as the ‘the ability to make 
informed choices about what should be done and how to go about doing it’. In addition we 
distinguish a higher level of critical autonomy: the capacity to compare cultural rules, to 
reflect upon the rules of one’s own culture, to work with others to change them. At this 
higher level, drawing on imagination, past examples or comparisons with other ways of life, 
people can begin to question the taken-for-granted cultural frames of their own ways of life 
 
Human need theory has been advanced from a variety of perspectives (Dover 2016). One of 
these is eudaimonic psychology (as opposed to hedonic psychology), which provides 
argument and evidence for three universal psychological needs for autonomy, competence 
and relatedness (Ryan and Deci, 2001; Ryan and Sapp (2007)). Related to this, other 
studies show that individuals whose life goals are more focused on wealth, image and fame 
than on relationship, personal growth and community evidence less self-esteem, self-
actualisation and life satisfaction (Kasser 2003, 2011). More materialistic individuals are 
most likely to be dissatisfied with life, lack vitality, and to suffer from anxiety, depression 
and addiction problems. Kasser (2011) concludes that where growth of consumption is a key 
goal of a nation universal psychological needs are undermined. Indeed this syndrome 
becomes self-reinforcing as such people turn to money and possessions as a way of coping 
with distress. 
 
Another contender is the capability approach advocated in different forms by Amartya Sen 
(1985) and Martha Nussbaum (2000, 2006). Sen’s version suffers from a fundamental 
problem: it provides no means for identifying basic functionings or capabilities common to a 
group of people let alone to all people. Sen famously rejects the search for, and lists of, 
universal valued functionings. In contrast Martha Nussbaum has argued for universal 
‘human functional capabilities’, derived initially from neo-Aristotelian reasoning 
subsequently replaced with a more Rawlsian idea of an emerging ‘overlapping consensus’ 
(Nussbaum 1993, 2000). It is notable that more recently she relies ultimately on the 
language of ‘need’ (Nussbaum 2006; Gough 2015). 
 
Table 1 demonstrates the close agreement on core human universals between these three 
theoretical approaches (Gough 2014). It is important to note that none of these need 
theories embody any hierarchy of needs, as proposed by Maslow (1954). 
 
Table 1. Core universal human needs in three theories  
Theory     
Doyal and 
Gough 1991 
Basic needs Participation Health  Autonomy 
Nussbaum 
2000 
Central human 
functional 
capabilities 
Affiliation Bodily 
integrity 
Practical 
reason 
Ryan and Deci 
2000, 2001 
Psychological needs Relatedness/belonging  Autonomy; 
competence 
 
 
Universal human needs have (at least) five theoretical features that aid us in identifying 
‘sustainable wellbeing’.  
Page 5 of 24
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/issue-ptrsa
Submitted to Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A - Issue
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
 Draft: Please do not copy, cite or distribute without permission of the author   
 6
 
First, human needs are objective. The truth of the claim that a person needs clean water or a 
modicum of security in childhood depends on the objective physiological and psychological 
requirements of human beings and the nature of the satisfier, including its capacity to 
contribute to the health and autonomy of the person. In contrast, the truth of the claim that 
a person prefers Bowie to the Beatles depends on the nature of the person’s beliefs about 
and attitudes towards the objects. Put another way, statements about wants are intentional, 
whereas statements of need are ‘extentional’: their truth depends on ‘the way the world is’ 
and not ‘the workings of my mind’ (Wiggins, 1987).  
 
Second, human needs are plural; they cannot be added up and summarised in a single unit 
of account. In addition to the basic needs for health and autonomy, we identify a list of 
universal ‘intermediate needs’: water and nutrition, shelter and energy, a non-threatening 
environment and work practices, significant primary relationships, security in childhood, 
physical and economic security, education and health care. In a wide-ranging study Alkire 
(2002 ch.2) surveys over 30 lists of ‘dimensions of human fulfilment’ and again 
demonstrates a  broad overlap of components. It is notable that all such lists include not 
only material goods but psychological goods, activities and relationships. 
 
Third, needs are non-substitutable: one domain of need-satisfaction or objective wellbeing 
cannot be traded off against another. More education is of no immediate help to someone 
who is ill through lack of vitamin C. Thus certain packages of need satisfiers are necessary 
for the avoidance of harm. This is quite different from consumer preferences in economic 
theory where substitutability is the default assumption: given a bundle of two goods it is 
always possible – by reducing the amount of one fractionally and increasing the amount of 
the other fractionally – to define a second bundle between which a consumer is ‘indifferent’ 
(O’Neill, 2011). 
 
Fourth, needs are satiable. It can be shown that the amount of intermediate needs required 
to achieve a given level of health and autonomy diminishes as their quantity increases, 
eventually plateauing (Dietz et al 2009; Jorgenson 2014). Thus the contribution of calories, 
dwelling space, even levels of childhood security, to basic needs can be satiated. In the case 
of the basic needs of health and autonomy, thresholds can be conceived where serious harm 
is avoided such that minimally acceptable levels of social participation can take place. The 
distributive principle entailed by human need theory is sufficiency: to bring all individuals up 
to such a threshold. It says nothing at this stage about inequalities above this level, but there 
are other reasons for justifying much more moderate inequality (Brandstedt 2013). Needs 
come with a built in distributive principle. 
 
Fifth, needs are cross-generational. This is of great importance since global warming will 
progressively impose dilemmas of intergenerational equity. We can assert with much 
confidence that the basic needs of future generations of humans will be the same as those 
of present humans. To avoid serious harm and to participate and act within future human 
societies people will require the same logical preconditions: not just survival, but health and 
autonomy. Future people will have needs for affiliation, cognitive and emotional expression, 
understanding and critical thought. The epistemology of reasoning about needs remains 
extentional, not intentional, and thus avoids the indeterminacy of reasoning about future 
preferences. Until the genetic make-up of Homo sapiens changes significantly, our 
successors will need a specific amount of the full range of intermediate needs. 
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Together, this amounts to a remarkable – and pretty obvious – degree of knowledge about 
the constituents of future peoples’ wellbeing. Compared to the indeterminacy of future 
generations’ preferences or happiness (or of Sen’s capabilities), a theory of need provides 
some firm foundations on which to build sustainability targets for public policy. The abilities 
to provide these components of objective welfare should be ‘passed down’ to future 
generations. In O’Neill’s (2011, p. 33) words: ‘Each generation needs to pass down the 
conditions for livelihood and good health, for social affiliation, for the development of 
capacities for practical reasoning, for engaging with the wider natural world and so on’.  
 
Finally, human needs have a sound alternative ethical grounding that preferences do not: 
they come along with claims of justice and equity in tow.4 Claims of need make moral 
demands on agents that preferences do not (O’Neill 2011). Universal needs imply ethical 
obligations on individuals and claims of justice - universal rights and obligations - on social 
institutions. An important corollary of the moral import of human need is that meeting 
needs should be given priority over meeting wants, if the two conflict or if resources are 
scarce. Human needs, present and future, trump present (and future) consumer 
preferences.5  
 
Necessities and need satisfiers  
When we turn to need satisfiers - the goods, services, activities and relationships that 
contribute to need satisfaction in any particular context – things are quite different. The 
needs for food and shelter apply to all peoples, but there are a large variety of cuisines and 
forms of dwelling that can meet any given specification of nutrition and protection from the 
elements. It is essential to draw a sharp distinction between universal needs and specific 
satisfiers. Without it, need theory could justly be accused of being paternalist, intrusive and 
insensitive to context and culture.  
 
How then can we identify necessities? In particular, since this article is focused on affluent 
societies – unequal, highly commodified and with a strong ideology of consumer sovereignty 
– how can a consensus ever be achieved around such contentious questions? My answer is 
to set out a broad methodology for identifying need satisfiers in particular contexts that is 
collective and consensual. The central argument is that identifying satisfiers must draw on 
two forms of knowledge: the codified knowledge of experts and the experientially grounded 
knowledge of ordinary people. The process to combine the two we call the ‘dual strategy’ 
(Doyal and Gough 1991, ch.14). 
 
The codified knowledge of the natural and social sciences enable us to determine the 
composition of many need satisfiers. It is embodied in the knowledge of practical experts,                                                         
4 ‘For standard economic analysis everything is a preference: the epicure’s wish for a little more 
seasoning, the starving child’s wish for a little water, the collector’s wish for one more painting, and 
the homeless person’s wish for privacy and warmth, all are preferences’ (Shue, 1993, p. 55). 
5 This can be stated formally, following Dobson (1998), who identifies four objects of concern for 
policy: 
Wp:  present-generation human wants 
Np: present-generation human needs 
Wf: future-generation human wants 
Nf: future-generation human needs 
The implied priority rule for the need theory set out above is: 
  Np = Nf > Wp/Wf 
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whether in health and medicine, engineering or biology, technology or policy science, and 
this knowledge is commonly used to help identify ‘what people need’: the components of a 
healthy diet, the education needs of children, the damage to our environment from 
pollutants and so on. Experts have a vital role to play in identifying need satisfiers. 
 
Experientially grounded or practical knowledge is the entire range of understandings and 
accumulated problem solving of people in their everyday lives and contexts. This too must 
contribute to deciding what objects, activities and relationships are necessary or essential 
for wellbeing in any given context. Policies that ignore this input can be irrelevant, 
inefficient, stupid or oppressive; for example, building new housing estates far from 
employment, shops or social activities without public transport and concentrating poor 
families within them. 
 
Clearly there is a dilemma here. Lauding the indispensable knowledge and power of science, 
technology, professions and experts runs the risks of uniformity, inflexibility, paternalism, 
disempowerment and domination, threatening the cultural integrity of groups and the 
autonomy of individuals. On the other hand, worthy initiatives to utilise experiential 
knowledge, to engage and empower citizens, carry the danger that sectional and short-term 
interests will threaten the identification of longer-term generalisable interests, especially 
when coupled with power differences in a context of inequality and media concentration.  
 
Thus we conclude that any rational and effective attempt to resolve disputes over need 
satisfiers ‘must bring to bear both the codified knowledge of experts and the experiential 
knowledge of those whose basic needs and daily life world are under consideration. It 
requires a dual strategy of social policy formation which values compromise, provided that it 
does not extend to the general character of basic human needs and rights’ (Doyal and 
Gough 1991:141).6 This is admittedly an ideal form of negotiation. In the real world 
interests, institutions and power imbalances will thwart it. In implementing the dual strategy 
one can only insist that the debate is as informed, participatory and free of vested interests 
as is possible.   
 
Defining sustainable necessities in practice 
 
The urgent need today is to identify consumption bundles that a) meet needs for decent 
living and b) are sustainable over time; in other words to define the upper and lower bounds 
of the consumption corridor. I look at each in turn. 
 
Bradshaw et al (2008) first pioneered a methodology to define a minimum acceptable 
standard of living, including ‘more than just, food, clothes and shelter. It is about having 
what you need in order to have the opportunities and choices necessary to participate in 
society’. The methodology used is ‘consensual discussions’ among citizens informed at 
successive stages by expert input. The dual strategy method is now being practically applied 
to estimate ‘decent living’ minimum standards across a range of EU member states (Storms, 
Bérénice, 2013). There are now accepted and proven methods of identifying necessities and 
distinguishing them from ‘luxuries’: an essential starting point if policies to pursue both 
human wellbeing and sustainability are to be developed.7                                                         6 We use the work of Habermas and Rawls to provide guidance on this process ((Habermas, 
1987),Rawls (1971), Doyal and Gough 1991, Chapter 7) 
7 The account that follows concerns rich OECD countries, but the method has been applied elsewhere. 
There are studies using a related ‘socially perceived necessities’ approach in developing countries, 
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For example, the 2014 MIS (Minimum Income Standard) study in the UK involved 12 focus 
groups in which members of the public from a range of social backgrounds were tasked with 
producing lists of items that households would need in order to reach ‘an acceptable 
minimum standard of living’. These different groups involved pensioners, working-age adults 
without children and parents with children. They interacted with experts, including a 
nutritionist who helped to construct adequate diets and a heating engineer who specified 
home energy requirements (Davis et al, 2014).  
 
This exercise has resulted in an agreed minimum consumption bundle that in some respects 
differs radically from the norm. The UK forums decided that private cars are luxuries and not 
necessary for a decent standard of living – citizens could use public transport plus taxis 
instead. The parents group, recognizing that it was increasingly likely that children in social 
housing would be expected to share bedrooms, concluded that this was not a standard that 
they agreed with and felt that in general the minimum should include a bedroom for each 
child of school age. Necessary food expenditures were agreed to be higher than present 
averages due to the consumption of more fresh fruit and vegetables.  
 
The implication of this research is that citizens can agree on a list of necessities at any point 
in time. The list will change over time in reaction to socio-technical shifts. In 2012, the group 
discussing the needs of households with children included a cheap second-hand car as a 
necessity for the first time, due to the decline of public transport. By 2014 all groups, 
including the pensioners group, regarded a computer, internet access and a cheap mobile 
phone subscription as a necessity. But, these apart, the definition of necessities has changed 
relatively slowly: the UK 2014 budgets were remarkably similar to the 2008 budgets, despite 
the financial crisis and recession in the meantime, reflecting a consistency in the ways that 
members of the public interpreted the rationales of necessity (Davis et al 2015).   
 
If the entire population were living on the ‘decent life budget’ then emissions would be 
lower: 37% lower than actual consumption-based UK emissions in 2004 according to 
research by Druckman and Jackson (2010) – Figure 2. Almost every category of consumption 
would deliver lower emissions except for food. Reductions are particularly noticeable in 
transport, household energy, restaurants and hotels, and miscellaneous household goods 
and services. In this hypothetical scenario, total UK consumption emissions would fall from 
26tCO2e per average household to 16tonnes.  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
such as South Africa (Wright and Noble 2013), Vietnam (Pro Poor Centre 2007) and Bangladesh 
(Ahmed 2007). The South African study found that deprived townships arrived at similar lists to the 
white population. For example under protective housing they list as necessities: mains electricity, a 
house protective against weather warm, fridge, separate bedrooms for adults and children, a flush 
toilet. Poorer countries will arrive at a less demanding list of necessities, but there is evidence that 
across the world the list of necessities is converging. For example in housing again: a minimum floor 
space per person, solid construction, continuous electricity supply. 90% of the world’s adult 
population now has access to a basic mobile phone (Rao and Min, forthcoming). 
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Figure 2. GHG per household per annum. 
Source: Druckman and Jackson (2010), Fig.2 
 
This is a significant reduction, but the problem is that this still equals 7.3 tonnes per person – 
well above the 2050 goal of 2 tonnes per person. In the UK and other rich countries, the 
emissions of the minimum consumption bundle exceed those of the maximum sustainable 
consumption bundle – and by more than three times! Studies in other countries replicate 
this finding: in Finland, people receiving minimum income benefits exceed ecologically 
sustainable lifestyles by a wide margin (Hirvilammi et al 2013). This is to be expected and 
backs up the Swedish modelling in Figure 1: C2 policies complement but don’t replace C1 
policies. To make consumption sustainable within existing socio-technical structures would 
deprive citizens of a vast range of goods and services that they have agreed are necessary 
for effective participation in modern life.  
 
But can the dual strategy be applied to pursue a different goal – to arrive at a consensual 
measure of more sustainable maximum levels of consumption? Returning to four of the UK 
focus groups and using the same methodology, one study explicitly asked them to consider 
their carbon footprint and agree on what might be ‘publicly acceptable’ (Druckman et al 
2011). The results were discouraging. There was some support for reducing heating energy 
by wearing more clothes at home, maintaining separate temperature zones and switching to 
energy-saving appliances, and some interest in cycling more and using public transport if it 
was more convenient and time-saving. There was very little interest in reducing 
consumption of red meat or eating only seasonal vegetables. The research found that 
people had got used to having a high degree of choice and did not want to be told what and 
what not to consume (Druckman et al 2011). This is just one small study in one country, but 
it is not optimistic that within contemporary society consumption can be consensually 
recomposed to any significant extent. 
 
More transformative approaches will clearly be needed. One approach is to use Max-Neef’s 
(1989) framework of human scale development (HSD), developed to enable small 
communities in Latin America and elsewhere to devise their own routes to a more people-
centred idea of development. It involves longer participatory workshops that can question 
goals, behaviours, satisfiers and infrastructures more radically and over longer time spans. 
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The HSD framework considers need satisfiers to be systematically related and 
interdependent and then searches for ‘synergic satisfiers’ that simultaneously meet 
different kinds of needs. To identify these entails a ‘deep learning journey’ going beyond 
focus groups to longer term and community based projects (Guillen-Royo 2016). This can 
best take place within communities already inspired by sustainability goals, such as eco-
villages and transition towns. But two problems remain. First, issues of equity and 
sustainability are rarely given equal consideration: HSD initiatives won’t always pay 
attention to environmental consequences, and sustainability initiatives won’t always pay 
attention to distributional and poverty issues. Second, there is a consistent problem in 
scaling up such initiatives in the face of overwhelming power imbalances and system lock-in. 
It is time to turn to these. 
 
Barriers to sustainable consumption in practice  
 
Theories of consumption vary on a wide spectrum from those privileging consumers as 
agents to those privileging corporate power and structural path dependency.8 This section 
discusses only the last two obstacles: an asymmetry in power and knowledge between 
corporations and consumers, and ‘lock-in’ to path-dependent structures. In selecting these 
for discussion I am making the assumption that neither orthodox consumer theory nor 
behavioural economic theory adequately address the determinants of consumer 
preferences. Consequently, the respective policy approaches condoned by these theories - 
providing better information and ‘nudging’ - will not be sufficient (Thaler and Sunstein, 
2008), Stoker 2009, Hodgson 2013). Other contributors to this collection provide a wider 
perspective on the role of market actors – corporations, consumers and new market forms - 
in fostering lower-carbon, more sustainable consumption (eg. Prabhu 2017; Frenken 2017).  
 
The corporate framework within which consumers operate and ‘choose’ is heavily biased to 
create novel consumer goods and services and to encourage absolute increases in 
consumption (Seyfang and Paavola, 2008). Advertising and marketing – the ‘engineering of 
consent’ (Bernays, 1955) - is of obvious importance in shaping consumer behavior, not 
always to the benefit of consumers.9 But these more obvious agency-based examples of 
corporate power rest on a less visible structural power, both the ability to determine 
investment and employment, and the discursive power of ideas such as consumer 
sovereignty and economic growth (Lindblom 1977; Gough 2000, ch.4). For example, Fuchs et 
al (2016) describe in some detail how such hidden power has delivered abundant cheap 
meat in modern society and thwarted attempts to regulate and limit it, despite external 
costs in health and emissions.  
 
Systems of provision lock households into patterns of consumption, as when rural and 
suburban residents have no viable alternatives to driving the car. ‘Lock-in’ refers to 
consumption driven by structural and institutional features of the society largely outside the 
scope of individual choice. For example, many car journeys – to commute, shop, drive 
children to school etc – might be caused by the spatial and social contexts within which 
people live and to which they must necessarily adapt. The needs framework can be adapted                                                         
8 This contrast echoes Duesenberry’s famous aphorism: "Economics is all about how people make 
choices; sociology is all about how they don't have any choices to make" (Duesenberry, 1960, p. 233) 
9 Two examples: one half of poor UK households persuaded to switch energy suppliers following 
doorstep sales found themselves with a worse energy deal than before (Hills, 2012). The vast majority 
of adults in Great Britain (82%) have regretted a purchase in the past year, amounting to 2– 10% of 
total consumer spending (Skelton and Allwood 2017). 
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to provide some insights here. Need satisfiers can be viewed as a hierarchy, as for example 
the need for use of a car (Mattioli 2016) – Table 2. 
 
Table 2: From basic needs to specific satisfiers 
Basic needs Social participation, health and autonomy 
Intermediate needs Income Nutrition Healthcare Relationships 
Satisfier level 1 Employment  Shopping Medical visits Social visits 
Satisfier level 2 Travel 
Satisfier level 3 Car 
 
 
Conceiving demand in this way helps analyse the nature of the lock-in. For example, is use of 
a car a necessary means to travel (level 3)? Does access to work and shopping require travel 
– to what extent could the internet replace work, shopping and social interaction (level 2)? 
To what extent does demand for travel reflect the spatial distribution of physical 
infrastructure (level 1)? The hierarchy demonstrates that in defining what is needed and 
sustainable attention must be paid to ‘lock-in’ as well as ‘luxury’ (Jackson and 
Papathanasopoulou, 2008). 
 
These two system-level barriers to sustainable consumption – corporate shaping of demand 
and inherited systems of provision - interact. Consumption actions result in unintended 
consequences that then shape future collective arrangements and future individual 
consumption actions. To investigate this takes us into social, structural and complexity 
theory that is beyond the scope of this paper. Giddens (1984) refers to this interplay 
between agency and structure as ‘structuration’. Individual actions result, via a composition 
effect, in aggregate outcomes that have little relationship with the original intentions of 
individual actors. Human history is ’created by intentional activities but in a non-intentional 
way’ (Mattioli 2016).  
 
This approach sheds light on some issues of justice in a climate-constrained world. Car use in 
a car-dependent setting may be essential for social participation and thus its denial or 
removal would constitute an unjust harm. Yet if this injustice is overcome at the expense of 
still higher transport emissions, it will entail further degradation of the natural environment 
and an unjust imposition on other peoples and on future generations.  
 
This is not to argue that there are no springs of change. Consumption practices are affected 
by longer term shifts in tastes and by socio-technical innovations. For example, consumer 
demand for private transport is falling among young adults across the developed world for a 
variety of reasons and car companies have not been able to halt that trend (Kuhnimoff et al, 
2012). Similarly the entry of new market players such as ZipCar and Uber may result in 
reductions of car ownership and more efficient use of existing resources (Frenken 2017). 
 
Income inequality and equity dilemmas 
 
Consumption demand in market systems is shaped not only by preferences but also by the 
level and distribution of incomes. Two further problems confronted en route to 
recomposing consumption are rising inequality and dilemmas of redistribution.  
 
Inequality of incomes has risen since around 1980 across the OECD, though at different rates 
(Piketty 2014). Argument and evidence shows that this has exacerbated status competition 
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in society, especially over ‘positional goods’. Coupled with corporate power it enhances 
competitive pressures to consume more and more (Frank 2007; Wilkinson and Pickett 2010; 
Pickett et al., 2014). Standards are inherently relative and involve comparisons with others. 
When the income distribution becomes stretched, more of the population, even the middle 
class, become aware they are falling behind the rich. In the neoliberal period since around 
1980 accelerating inequality has, notably in the Anglosphere, driven up household debt and 
to compensate for lower wage growth, and halted the previous decline in average hours of 
work. Both debt and work hours add further to the link between inequality and 
unsustainability (Stiglitz 2013; Bowles and Park 2005).  
 
 
Figure 3 Per capita GHG emissions per £ of income, by income decile and sector, UK 2006 
Source: Gough et al 2011, Table 8 
 
 
Inequality can also generate equity dilemmas in implementing carbon mitigation 
programmes. Though consumption emissions rise with household income, they do so at a 
slower rate. Lower income households face noticeably higher emissions per £ spent – Figure 
3. Thus any rise in carbon prices, when generalized throughout the economy, will impact on 
lower income households more. The degree of this regressive impact varies according to the 
type of consumption. Expenditures on, and emissions from, domestic energy and food take a 
proportionately higher share of incomes lower down the income scale than spending on, 
and emissions from, transport, consumer goods and personal services (Gough et al 2011). As 
a result, carbon mitigation programmes can increase poverty and inequality.10                                                         
10 For example, the UK imposes a suite of obligations on energy companies to aid poorer and less 
well-housed groups improve insulation, renew boilers etc. Yet because these improvements are paid 
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This follows because necessities have in general a higher than average carbon footprint – 
see Appendix. This poses a potential tension between securing emission reductions and 
ensuring an equitable distribution. It suggests that simply redistributing income to low-
income households might, ceteris paribus, raise rather than lower total emissions as more 
money is available to spend on high-emitting basic goods. This lends support to a conclusion 
of Koch and Fritz (2014: 698) about welfare states: ‘The same mechanism that defuses the 
socio-economic inequalities inherent in capitalist development ensures the inclusion of an 
increasing number of people in environmentally problematic production and consumption 
processes’. 
    
Thus carbon pricing is always inequitable; yet redistributing incomes will, all other things 
being equal, increase emissions! There appears to be a fundamental tension between 
meeting basic needs and cutting emissions.   
  
However much depends on where the redistributed income and associated emissions comes 
from – if it is due to a cap on excessive emissions by the affluent this could more than offset 
the higher emissions of low-income households on, for example, heating and food. 
Moreover, comparative research finds that carbon intensities for housing and domestic 
energy are much lower in Norway and Sweden than other OECD countries, reflecting the 
extensive presence of district heating, biomass, hydro-electricity and better insulation in the 
two Nordic countries (Kerkhof et al. 2009). In which case taxing energy would not 
discriminate against poorer households. Different forms of technology and infrastructure 
can thus profoundly improve the eco-efficiency of specific sectors and thus the potential 
equity-sustainability trade-off pictured in the Appendix Table A1. Nevertheless, we have 
demonstrated that there are potential trade-offs between sustainability and equity when 
reforming the sphere of consumption. 
 
State policies for recomposing consumption 
 
The conclusion thus far is that changing consumer preferences will be constrained by 
corporate power, system lock-in, and the interaction between the two. Growing inequality 
also makes recomposing consumption more difficult and creates dilemmas in redistributing 
incomes in high-carbon economies. The upshot of the above is that recomposing 
consumption will require in addition some hefty top-down state interventions. Many will be 
required to influence the eco-efficiency of production (the C1 goal).11 But a range of novel 
C2 interventions will also be needed to recompose consumption in a fair way: a suite of 
‘eco-social policies’ that simultaneously and explicitly pursue both equity/justice and 
sustainability/ sufficiency goals. I conclude with some suggestions here. 
                                                                                                                                                               
for out of higher energy bills they bear more heavily on lower income households and paradoxically 
increase rather than reduce ‘fuel poverty’ (Hills, 2012). 
 
11 Four policy pillars for GHG mitigation can be distinguished: Carbon pricing, Strategic carbon-saving 
investment, Public regulation, and Behaviour change and public engagement (cf Grubb et al 2014). All 
of these can contribute to the achievement of C1 eco-efficiency policies. But some can also influence 
C2, the composition of consumption. For example, the minimum Consumption Scenario cited above 
assumes that UK housing is insulated to a higher quality than at present, which will require an 
ambitious programme of retrofitting entailing public guidance, regulation, loans and subsidy. I do not 
consider other C1 interventions in this paper. 
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Taxing high-carbon luxuries: smart VAT.  
 
The economist Robert Frank (2011)2007) has long argued for a progressive consumption tax, 
on sustainability as well as equity grounds. A major justification is that it would curb the rate 
of expansion in mass wants and desires. However, it may not be progressive, since it would 
benefit high-saving, richer households. But in all OECD countries except the US there exists 
an explicit tax on consumption - Value-Added Tax (VAT) - that raises about a fifth of all tax 
revenues and is a major funder of social programmes. The VAT rate in most EU countries 
today varies between 20% and 25%, but in all countries there are exemptions and lower 
rates applied to certain goods and services. These usually include basic foodstuffs but vary 
greatly across countries, following pressures from particular industries and lobby groups.12  
 
The argument for a ‘smart VAT’ is to introduce deliberate variations in the rate, higher to 
discourage bad consumption and lower to encourage desirable consumption. The proposal 
has mainly been advocated on health and wellbeing grounds, to improve healthy eating and 
discourage obesity (Fell 2016). But it could also be amended to take account of 
sustainability. Thus high-GHG goods that harmed wellbeing would attract the highest VAT 
rates, while low-carbon goods that improve wellbeing would be taxed at lower or even 
negative rates (amounting to a subsidy).  
 
This entails an assault on common notions of consumer sovereignty and would meet 
corporate, retail and consumer opposition discussed above. To secure legitimacy and public 
support, Fell realises that forms of citizenship engagement along dual strategy lines would 
be necessary. To decide what goods are virtuous and what harmful he proposes regular 
deliberative dialogue in focus groups informed by environmental and social experts. This 
exercise could draw on the MIS studies and equivalent exercises such as the Northern 
Ireland ‘healthy food basket’. These decision would then be fed up to a second stage of 
public decision-making to decide on the different VAT rates. Fell concedes that this stage 
would likely require economic expertise, such as the Office of Budgetary Responsibility in 
the UK, but to be effective smart VAT rates should vary widely between perhaps +25% and -
20%. To publicise what is happening they should be displayed on all goods in shops and 
should be monitored and adjusted as necessary.  
 
There is no reason why the emissions footprint of consumption practices should not be 
integrated into this process alongside health and other basic need goals. Smart VAT provides 
a broad framework within which specific proposals to tax high carbon non-essentials could 
fit, such as a frequent flyer levy or a global tax on business-class flight tickets (Chancel and 
Piketty 2014). It provides a workable method to scale up a dual strategy for sustainable 
consumption.  
 
Social tariffs  
Water, electricity and gas utilities are, up to certain level of consumption, basic but high 
carbon necessities. Direct regulation of utility prices would provide a simple method of 
securing both greater sustainability and equity. This would require energy and water 
companies to operate a ‘rising block tariff’, with lower tariffs for initial units of electricity, 
gas or water consumed, and higher tariffs for successive units. At present energy tariffs work 
in the opposite way, mirroring the cost structure of utilities faced with large fixed costs to 
maintain the network. To reverse this would recognize the basic need component of the first 
                                                        
12 The UK, almost alone, charges a much lower rate (5%) on residential energy. 
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block of household energy and the progressive choice element in successive units.13 The 
total average price of domestic energy would continue to rise over time, as part of the 
carbon pricing strategy, but the distribution of the burden would be skewed more to higher 
consumption households. Related tariffs schemes have been implemented in some 
countries in southern Europe (Schaffrin, 2014). It would be difficult to administer in the 
privatised energy system of most countries today and is opposed by energy suppliers.  
 
Widening social consumption.  
Turning to the expenditure side of fiscal policy, health, education and social care are further 
necessities which for other reasons are usually supplied free or at low cost to all citizens via 
collective public funding. There are several reasons for raising the share of state social 
consumption as part of an eco-social strategy. First, tax-financed social consumption such as 
health services, social care and education is inherently redistributive: allocation according to 
need, risk or citizenship, not market demand, automatically serves redistributive social goals 
– even if the tax system is neutral rather than progressive. Second, research shows that this 
saves carbon. For example, the US health care system directly accounts for 8% of emissions 
in the US, compared with 3% of UK emissions directly stemming from the NHS. This is due 
both to the greater macro-efficiency and lower expenditure shares of health in the UK, but 
also to lower emissions per £ or $ spent, due to better allocation of resources and 
procurement practices and to explicit carbon-saving programmes (Chung and Meltzer, 
2009).  
 
Rationing: Personal carbon allowances.  
The most direct and radical way to simultaneously recompose consumption in a sustainable 
and equitable direction would be ‘downstream’ rationing of carbon between households. A 
country’s total GHG emissions would be capped (decreasing year by year) and this amount 
divided into equal annual allowances for each adult resident, with variable rates for children 
(Environmental Audit Committee, 2008; (Fawcett and Parag, 2010). In effect, a dual 
accounting standard and currency is developed: energy, goods and services would have both 
a money price and a carbon price. Some propose a trading element whereby those who emit 
less carbon than the average could sell their surplus allowances and gain, while higher 
emitters would pay a market price for their excess. Advocates claim that a PCAT scheme 
covering domestic energy, road fuel and air travel would curb consumption in a progressive 
way. However, PCAT does not avoid all issues of fairness; for example, those living in 
inefficient or underutilised housing, dependent on car travel, or with special needs would 
face difficulties. Too many exceptions to the standard allowance could undermine the 
scheme, but too few would result in rough justice, which could undermine public support. 
Integration with upstream cap and trade systems, eg the ETS, would raise problems. There 
are also several practical as well as political issues to be faced (Fawcett and Parag, 2010).  
 
These are some ways in which democratic states can begin to shift contemporary 
consumption practices to both reduce emissions and pursue the equitable and just 
satisfaction of basic human needs. In concentrating on ‘top-down’ policies I am not 
underestimating the powerful role of local action and bottom-up perspectives (Ostrom 
2009; Whitmarsh 2011; Jackson and Victor 2013). But states will remain central actors in the 
Anthropocene (Duit 2014).  
                                                        
13 Larger households and households with children and disabled people would have higher needs. 
Some method of taking these into account would need to be found. 
Page 16 of 24
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/issue-ptrsa
Submitted to Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A - Issue
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
 Draft: Please do not copy, cite or distribute without permission of the author   
 17
 
Conclusions 
 
To have a hope of mitigating climate change fast enough means targeting consumption in 
rich countries alongside production. Yet consumer demand rarely figures in climate policy 
because it questions consumers’ tastes and challenges some formidable corporate interests 
and structural obstacles. This paper makes the case for a new policy domain – to 
‘recompose’ consumption by switching from high- to low-carbon goods and services, 
without necessarily cutting overall consumption expenditure. At the same time this 
recomposition must be fair, on grounds of justice and legitimacy, especially since cutting 
emissions can have regressive distributional effects. 
 
To target both goals – sustainability and equity – in consumption we need to distinguish 
necessities or basic goods from luxuries or surplus goods. Theories of human need can 
identify universal and objective components of wellbeing applicable across time and space. 
Identifying need satisfiers or necessities requires a further methodology fostering a dialogue 
of citizens and experts. We show where these methods have been used to identify bundles 
of satisfiers for an acceptable minimum standard of living and then turn to examine 
problems in applying this method to identify a maximum sustainable consumption standard. 
Under present socio-technical conditions, the minimum exceeds the maximum, so demand 
policies must be implemented alongside eco-efficiency policies in production.  
 
Recomposing consumption along these lines can provide guidance of what consumption 
items to target and what not. It will require the efforts of numerous agents, citizens, civil 
society, business and others. But a major role for government will endure and expand as a 
conduit for linking the dual strategy to political action. To ensure that emission reduction 
and social justice go hand in hand the paper ends by outlining a range of eco-social policies. 
 
 
The recomposition of consumption advocated here has three advantages. First, it forms a 
distinct strategy for climate mitigation alongside green growth and improvements in 
emissions efficiency. Second, it relates consumption to fundamental aspects of wellbeing. 
Third, it embodies a distributional ethic and a case for redistribution. It could play a central 
role in a strategy for material demand reduction.  
  
Page 17 of 24
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/issue-ptrsa
Submitted to Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A - Issue
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
 Draft: Please do not copy, cite or distribute without permission of the author   
 18
Appendix 
 
It is possible to use a different ‘consumer behavior’ method to distinguish necessities from 
luxuries according to the income elasticity - the ratio of the percentage change in 
expenditure emissions to the percentage change in household income – of different 
consumption items. Necessities have an income or expenditure elasticity of less than one, 
non-necessities or ‘luxuries’ greater than one (Baxter and Moosa, 1996). This will not 
necessarily agree with the social consensual method outlined in the paper, for example 
regarding alcohol and tobacco as necessary goods, but there is a strong overlap. Table A1 
plots income elasticities against the emissions intensity of the different categories in the 
form of a 2x2 matrix. It is clear that the core necessities in the top right hand cell (shaded) 
are high emitters of carbon or other GHGs and contrast with luxuries in the cell diagonally 
opposite. The scale of high carbon necessities would be still greater if it also included 
essential transport – the data used does not permit any disaggregation of transport.  
 
Table A1: Categories of personal consumption by necessity and emission content, UK 2009 
 Low GHG 
< 1 tonne CO2e/£000 
High GHG 
> 1 tonne CO2e/£000 
Necessities: 
Income elasticity 
< 1 
Alcoholic beverages/tobacco 
(0.7%) 
Communication (1.2%) 
All domestic energy (electricity, gas, other 
fuels) (26.9%) 
Food (12.9%) 
 
Luxuries: 
Income elasticity 
> 1 
Clothing and footwear (2.6%) 
Other housing (2.3%) 
Furnishings (5.0%) 
Recreation and culture (8.7%) 
Restaurants and hotels (5.0%) 
Private health (0.5%) 
Private education (0.3%) 
Miscellaneous (4.2%) 
All transport (vehicle fuels, other transport) 
(22.5%) 
Source: Chitnis et al 2014: Tables 5, A.5 
Note: The figures in brackets show the shares of total GHG footprint emissions accounted 
for. 
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